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Municipalities aiming at mitigating climate change by implementing new energy efﬁciency technologies
face budgetary and capacity constraints. Outsourcing through energy service contracting could provide a
solution. This paper reports results from a survey of 1298 municipalities concerning barriers to retro-
ﬁtting public street lighting and the possible role of energy service contracting to overcome these bar-
riers. Using a logistic regression analysis, the authors investigate determinants of opting for energy
service contracts in the speciﬁc context of LED retroﬁts. Results point to an advantage of outsourcing in a
ﬁnancially and capacity-constrained environment, which corresponds with the main reasons for enga-
ging in contracting: minimising investments and ﬁnancial risks. However, municipalities often do not
fully grasp the risks associated with retroﬁtting especially using a novel technology such as LED. In
relation to that they underestimate the risk reduction potential of energy performance contracts (EPC).
Previous experience with outsourcing increases the probability to engage in servitization although cer-
tain existing partnerships, particularly with utilities, prevent municipalities from considering energy
performance contracts. Interestingly, engaging an energy consultant has a negative propensity to use
energy service contracts, while pre-negotiated standardised contracts for energy performance contracts
have a positive inﬂuence.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Municipalities are required to modernise their aging
infrastructure, increase energy and cost effectiveness to
tackle climate change and provide public services while
facing limited investment budgets (Sorrell, 2015; Sorrellr Ltd. This is an open access article
ol of Economics (USE),
EC Utrecht, The Netherlands.et al., 2004). Outsourcing services has been highlighted as a
possible solution to this dilemma (Roehrich et al., 2014;
Bennett, 2006; Sorrell, 2005). Energy service contracting is
a means of outsourcing the procurement and delivery of
energy services but it may only be appropriate for a subset
of energy services in the public sector (Sorrell, 2005; Polzin
et al., 2015).
The literature has engaged with the questions of out-
sourcing energy related public services on two levels: First,
the energy service company (ESCo) business model hasunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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et al., 2006, 2014; Marino et al., 2011). Second, there is
micro-level conceptual and qualitative evidence of ESCo
business models suitability for public service application
(Hannon and Bolton, 2015; Hannon et al., 2013; Pätäri and
Sinkkonen, 2014; Aasen et al., 2016; Polzin et al., 2015).
Energy service contracts, speciﬁcally energy performance
contracts (EPCs), have received speciﬁc attention in this
context. EPCs (hitherto also referred to as ESCo solutions)
are understood as contracts that deliver 'ﬁnal energy ser-
vices' where the capital investment is recovered from en-
ergy cost savings (see Sorrell (2005) for a more detailed
account).
Quantitative analysis of drivers and barriers for en-
ergy service contracting and speciﬁcally EPCs in the
public sphere have been lacking (Pätäri and Sinkkonen,
2014; Hannon and Bolton, 2015; Hartmann et al., 2014;
Aasen et al., 2016). The purpose of this paper is to
provide quantitative evidence of drivers and barriers for
energy related public infrastructure modernisation
(retroﬁtting) through energy service contracting, spe-
ciﬁcally EPCs. Our research question reads as follows:
Which factors determine municipal engagement in an
energy performance contract (EPC) for energy infra-
structure modernisation?
We analyse the case of public sector application of LED
(light-emitting diodes) street lighting in Germany as an
example of a market where some of the barriers to ret-
roﬁtting existing infrastructure are being addressed
through energy service contracting alongside other
forms of municipal energy infrastructure governance (in-
house, energy utility (EUCo)1, multi-utility (MUCo)2 so-
lutions or concessions). Street lighting in Germany re-
presents a major cost factor, accounting for almost one
third of municipal electricity budgets (DStGB, 2010). This
provides a strong incentive for municipalities to engage
in modernisation activities to reduce costs as well as
end-use energy demand and to alleviate budget con-
straints (Difu, 2014).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 describes the theoretical background and de-
velops the hypotheses which are operationalised
through our research design (Section 3). Section 4 de-
scribes the main results of the survey analysis and dis-
cusses our ﬁndings in light of previous research. Over-
arching conclusions and policy implications are drawn
in Section 5.2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Governments around the world are facing challenges
to ﬁnance, operate and maintain, let alone improve the
energy performance of their properties (Zhang et al.,
2015; Radulovic et al., 2011; dena 2015; Hannon and
Bolton, 2015). Energy performance may be improved by
procuring innovative green technologies and services1 EUCos typically engage in energy generation and supply. They may also en-
gage in distribution and transmission (Hannon et al. (2013), p.1036).
2 In the German context MUCo refers speciﬁcally to local ‘Stadtwerke’, which
tend to provide a wide range of utilities such as gas, electricity and municipal waste
management. Strong local embedding ensures that these MUCos enjoy near
monopolies on most supply and waste streams which can provide incentives for
integrated solutions (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006).(Testa et al., 2016; Hannon et al., 2015; Sorrell, 2007).
However, public sector engagement in modernisation
activities using innovative end-use energy demand
technologies (‘retroﬁtting’) requires signiﬁcant upfront
investments and enhanced capacities to handle the as-
sociated risks. These risks arise out of uncertain returns
on investment as trusted information on quality, energy
savings and durability of new products (such as LED) are
missing. The payback period of associated high upfront
investments also largely depends on uncertain future
energy costs (Jackson, 2010).
In this case outsourcing, involving an energy service
company (ESCo), can provide a solution (Bennett, 2006;
Hartmann et al., 2014; Helle, 1997; Roehrich et al.,
2014). This outsourcing process involves a shift in gov-
ernance structure from hierarchies (in-house provision)
to markets (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002). This
paper focuses on energy performance contracts that
include guaranteed savings for the client (EPCs) as a
sub-category of energy service contracts (Nolden et al.,
2015; Sorrell, 2007). The ESCo assumes control over the
secondary energy conversion and control equipment
that converts primary energy streams into useful energy
such as thermostats, boilers or lamps as part of an EPC
(Sorrell, 2007, 2005). This allows the ESCo to identify,
deliver and maintain savings using guarantees for cer-
tain standards (e.g. lighting) at an operational cost ty-
pically lower than its customers’ current or projected
energy bill. Capital investment by the ESCo will be re-
covered by energy savings as well as other savings such
as maintenance costs. The retroﬁtting activities are ﬁ-
nanced using debt and a forfeiting mechanism that al-
lows ESCos to beneﬁt from their clients' credibility or
directly through client debt. The assets installed can
either be accounted for on the balance sheet of the cli-
ent or the ESCo. Risks associated with long payback
periods for retroﬁts may favour ESCo solutions and as-
sociated guarantees (Hannon et al., 2013; Marino et al.,
2011; Sorrell, 2007).
To date, research has focused primarily on two as-
pects of outsourcing through energy service contract-
ing. Using expert survey techniques scholars have
highlighted overall drivers and barriers for the ongoing
ESCo market development primarily in the US and
Europe (Bertoldi et al., 2006; Bertoldi et al., 2014;
Marino et al., 2011; Vine, 2005; Hannon et al., 2015;
Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). Using in-depth case studies,
scholars also analysed business models of ESCos such as
EPC and the role of ESCos in the wider energy system
(transition) (Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014; Hannon and
Bolton, 2015; Hannon et al., 2013; Haas et al., 2008;
Aasen et al., 2016). Complementing both streams of
literature, we develop hypotheses about the relation-
ship between a local authority and an ESCo.
2.1. Barriers to retroﬁtting as potential drivers for an ESCo solution
Prior qualitative research has pointed towards a poten-
tial suitability of energy service contracting to address
barriers currently hindering the diffusion of innovative
end-use energy demand reduction technologies (Polzin
et al., 2015; Steinberger et al., 2009; Aasen et al., 2016).
Technological factors (e.g. quality and durability), economic
factors (high upfront costs and uncertain future energy
3 The UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (Mayor of London 2014) as
well as SBI (2013) in Germany have recently published a standardised contract on
their websites to help reduce transaction costs further.
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the maintenance backlog) determine whether outsourcing
using a third-party contractor is considered (Roehrich
et al., 2014; Steinberger et al., 2009; Aasen et al., 2016;
Wilson et al., 2012; Sorrell et al., 2004).
Improving the energy performance of public properties
requires signiﬁcant amounts of upfront investments into
energy-related technologies that typically have a long
payback period (Suhonen and Okkonen, 2013). One of the
main reasons for public actors to engage with a private
contractor (ESCo) is therefore the reduction of the overall
ﬁnancial burden (limited budgets) as energy and cost
savings are typically guaranteed (Polzin et al., 2015; Sorrell,
2007; Sorrell et al., 2004; Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014;
Uyarra et al., 2014). Hence our ﬁrst hypothesis relates to
savings by using EPC:
H1a. Financial constraints encourage outsourcing.
Second, limited competencies prevent local autho-
rities from procuring innovative (green) goods and
services which poses a signiﬁcant barrier for retroﬁtting
(Polzin et al., 2015; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia,
2012; Uyarra et al., 2014). These competencies were not
necessary in the past as more efﬁcient energy technol-
ogies evolved slowly. If municipalities lack in-house
competencies and capacities to carry out retroﬁts, this
might be a case in point for sourcing these from a third
party:
H1b. Personnel capacity constraints encourage outsourcing.
Third, management of the retroﬁtting process requires
enhanced capabilities and capacities. One way of acquiring
these skills is by engagement. Prior research has high-
lighted that positive experience with outsourcing and
corresponding trust leads to increased awareness, a posi-
tive attitude towards energy service contracting and an
increased likelihood of considering this form of out-
sourcing (Backlund and Eidenskog, 2013; Marino et al.,
2011; Hannon and Bolton, 2015; Pätäri and Sinkkonen
2014). Correspondingly our hypothesis reads as follows:
H1c. Existing partnerships encourage outsourcing.
Fourth, in the retroﬁtting process of municipal infra-
structure, the assessment and management of risk re-
presents a crucial task (Jackson, 2010; Uyarra et al., 2014;
Sorrell, 2007). Uncertainties regarding payback periods for
energy efﬁciency projects may be ampliﬁed by volatile
energy prices and unpredictable regulation of the energy
market etc. (Toffel, 2002; Sorrell, 2005). Hannon and Bol-
ton (2015) argue that the degree of risk-aversion de-
termines the establishment of a partnership with a local
ESCo. Consequently we hypothesize:
H1d. The higher the perceived risks of achieving the savings
generated by the retroﬁtting measures, the higher the tendency
towards outsourcing.
In line with addressing barriers for retroﬁtting as pos-
sible drivers for an EPC solution, we hypothesize that al-
leviating ﬁnancial constraints and personnel constraints as
well as addressing the corresponding risks are also the
explicitly stated main drivers for local authorities to engage
in an EPC (Polzin et al., 2015; Hannon and Bolton, 2015;
Aasen et al., 2016). Hence the following hypotheses read:H2a. Reason to engage in energy performance contracting is the
minimisation of ﬁnancial exposure.
H2b. Reason to engage in energy performance contracting is the
minimisation of personnel.
H2c. Reason to engage in energy performance contracting is the
minimisation of risk.
2.2. Barriers to EPC in the public sector
Where EPCs are suitable for the delivery of energy ser-
vices in the public sector, as is the case with street lighting,
prior qualitative research has highlighted factors that are
restricting the diffusion of EPC (Polzin et al., 2015). Missing
personnel capacity to manage the contract is one. A recent
case study of Norwegian municipalities revealed that
committed public sector decision makers could facilitate
EPC retroﬁtting solutions and correspondingly increase the
likelihood of outsourcing solutions to be considered (Aasen
et al., 2016). In the absence of those capacities we hy-
pothesize that:
H3a. Missing capacity and competencies to engage with EPC poses
a severe barrier to EPC diffusion.
Furthermore, Polzin et al. (2015), Pätäri and Sinkkho-
nen (2014) and Marino et al. (2011) summarised barriers
relating to contract design. These include the missing
ﬂexibility and legal complexities in a long-term ESCo
contract and a perceived unfair balance of interests also
aggravated by bad experiences with prior outsourcing
efforts. Aasen et al. (2016) found ﬂexible contracts to be a
signiﬁcant driver in the municipal context in Norway.
More speciﬁcally they refer to the possibility of addres-
sing maintenance backlogs through EPCs. Standardised
contracts that reduce ﬂexibility, on the other hand, reduce
transaction costs. This has been a signiﬁcant driver in the
municipal context in the UK and Germany.3 In the UK it is
often assumed that the sole purpose of an EPC is to ad-
dress maintenance and retroﬁt backlogs. Resulting from
the discussion we hypothesize that from a municipal
point of view, the absence of ﬂexibility acts as a barrier:
H3b. Disadvantageous contract design (such as lack of balance of
interests and ﬂexibility) hinders local authority engagement in
EPC.
Finally, due to the variety of governance structures
for street lighting provision speciﬁcally in Germany,
incumbent (existing) legal arrangements with an EUCo
or a MUCo prevent the use of ESCo solutions. These
contracts allow the public body to beneﬁt from private
sector organisational effectiveness and efﬁciency to
carry out the services while at the same time retaining
strategic control. The municipality may even choose
(partial) ownership over the third party that carriers
out retroﬁts and provides energy services (Hannon and
Bolton, 2015). However, these contracts usually do not
include a performance-based element associated with
EPCs, which incentivizes the third party to use efﬁcient
retroﬁtting technologies. Additionally, MUCos and EU-
Cos often also produce and sell electricity which
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into long-term arrangements has also been identiﬁed as
a major barrier for new ESCo companies in other con-
texts such as the UK (Polzin et al., 2015; Hannon et al.,
2013), hence:
H3c. Existing long-term contracts or partnerships prevent the use
of an ESCo solution.
2.3. Competencies, capacities and tools to conduct an EPC
In order to address the above mentioned barriers to the
use of EPC, the literature also identiﬁed a range of drivers
that facilitate the tendering, implementation and man-
agement of EPC. Using an outsourcing solution requires
enhanced competencies on the client side such as open
book and energy cost information that allows the deﬁni-
tion of a baseline and the corresponding procedures for
measurement and veriﬁcation (Marino et al., 2011; Pätäri
and Sinkkonen, 2014; Aasen et al., 2016). ESCos perform
signiﬁcantly better if the tenders are not over-speciﬁed
(which lead to the implementation of particular products
or the choice of particular suppliers) (Polzin et al., 2015;
Uyarra et al., 2014). Hence, transparent cost management
favours considering an EPC solution.
H4a. Detailed energy cost information leads to a higher tendency
towards outsourcing.
On the other hand, if municipalities acquire or already
possess the necessary competencies and capacities re-
garding both innovative technologies and their im-
plementation as well as tendering schemes to carry out the
retroﬁt, we hypothesize that this would lead to a lower
propensity of considering an outsourcing solution (Polzin
et al., 2015; Sorrell, 2007).
H4b. Technical knowledge leads to a lower tendency towards
outsourcing.
To improve competencies on the client side, the use of
tools to implement the retroﬁtting process, including
planning, tendering and implementation of the moder-
nisation increases the chances of an EPC solution to be
considered. On the other hand, acquiring the necessary
competencies could also lead to a higher propensity of
conducting an in-house modernisation as products and
tenders may be better evaluated (Hartmann et al., 2014;
Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). Accordingly we develop two
concurring hypotheses:
H5a. Using tools for the modernisation lead to a higher tendency
towards outsourcing.
H5b. Using tools for the modernisation lead to a lower tendency
towards outsourcing.
2.4. The role of consultants in EPC
If neither competencies nor capacities are present in-
house, prior research suggest the positive role of facil-
itators to handle the complexity of the whole retroﬁtting
process lifecycle, ranging from the (neutral) tendering
process, implementation of the project as well as mea-
surement and veriﬁcation. One has to distinguish between
purely technical consultants, focusing on implementing the
retroﬁts and process oriented consultants that facilitate the
procurement process. These agents mostly consult onbehalf of a client, act as an intermediary between the ESCo
and the client, ensure competition between the different
kinds of suppliers and facilitate the implementation of the
project. Thus they can play an important and enabling role
(Bleyl et al., 2013; Polzin et al., 2015; Lemon et al., 2015).
H6. Using an energy consultant or facilitator leads to a higher
tendency towards outsourcing.3. Methodology
3.1. Research context
To uncover the factors affecting the municipal use of EPC
for retroﬁtting we analysed public lighting infrastructure
retroﬁts with LED lamps in German municipalities. German
municipalities are typically short in budgets with total
municipal debt amounting to €133.6bn in 2013 (Difu, 2014;
DStGB, 2014). Investing in energy efﬁciency can alleviate
ﬁnancial constraints and help municipalities meet climate
change targets (Bennett, 2006; dena, 2015; Hartmann
et al., 2014; Hendricks, 2014) but overburdening debt often
limits capacities to seek and engage in energy efﬁciency
projects.
At the same time the lighting industry has recently
undergone major shifts from traditional lamps towards LED
with signiﬁcant savings in terms of energy and costs (IEA,
2013). As a result, application of this technology is proving
to be challenging for both manufacturers and customers
(Sanderson and Simons, 2014; Smink et al., 2015; Bergek
and Onufrey, 2014), despite forecasts of LED market shares
increasing from less than 10% to 70% by 2020 (McKinsey,
2012).
The example of Germany is particularly revealing as
municipal independence and its federal state structure
have lent themselves to the establishment of diverse
governance mechanisms for the provision of street
lighting services, including an emerging ESCo market for
lighting. 27% of municipalities provide street lighting in-
house, 35% outsourced the management to EUCos, an-
other 10% to MUCos and 25% partially outsourced services
such as maintenance. 3% of municipalities use ESCo so-
lutions to manage their street lighting (dena, 2012). Ad-
ditionally, the German government launched an energy
service contracting initiative by providing standardised
contracts (SBI, 2013; BMBF, 2014).
3.2. Survey design
To derive a quantitative research design and model for
this study, we conducted an extensive literature review
(see Section 2) and a qualitative study, interviewing 40
experts participating in the process of retroﬁtting public
street lighting (with LED) and confronted with the choice
between different modes of governance (including energy
service contracting) (Polzin et al., 2015). This set-up al-
lowed us to combine drivers and barriers for the use of EPC
based on the literature with context-dependent results
from our previous qualitative study. Hence we derived in-
dicators for the above mentioned hypotheses.
The overall aims of this study were to gather data on
Germany's street lighting inventory, to analyse trends re-
garding retroﬁtting, to identify drivers and barriers in the
retroﬁtting process and to evaluate the possible role of
Table 1
Response rates across the sample.
Size Inhabitants Populationa Responses Response rate (%)
Very small o5000 8323 362 4.3
Small 5000o50,000 2692 799 29.7
Medium 50,000o100,000 106 79 74.5
Large 4100,000 76 58 76.3
Total: 11,197 1298 11.6
a German federal statistical ofﬁce/statista.com (2012/2013).
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municipal “Energiewende” in Germany and beyond.
3.3. Data collection, sample and data processing
To develop an empirical perspective on the determi-
nants of EPC take-up in the public sector, our data collec-
tion captured the view of public clients on public property
retroﬁtting (in this case: public street lighting). Hence we
developed a survey based on the theoretical framework
(Section 2) and the qualitative study (Polzin et al., 2015).
Combining qualitative and quantitative elements in a study
is considered a mixed method approach (Creswell and
Clark, 2010).
An important aspect to be taken into account, when
using this methodological approach, is the potential
presence of common method bias (i.e. gathering all in-
formation for this analysis via a survey). This type of bias
generally affects survey data (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Following Testa et al. (2016) we adopted several mea-
sures to reduce the bias. We started by minimising item
ambiguity in the questionnaire, which included avoiding
vague concepts, complicated syntax and unfamiliar
terms. We deliberately kept questions simple, speciﬁc
and concise. A pretest with selected municipalities vali-
dated the survey and the wording of the questions. We
also guaranteed the respondents anonymity.
The questionnaire consisted of items relating to gov-
ernance structure, management of street lighting, street
lighting inventory, retroﬁtting (technologies used, drivers
and barriers) and energy service contracting (EPC ap-
proach, drivers, and barriers) as well as information on
street lighting expertise, tools, consultation and ﬁnancial
support mechanisms. For a detailed list of questions
please consult the Appendix A. In the period from May
2014 – July 2014, German local government institutions
were surveyed using a fully structured website based
online survey (34 questions in 12 groups). Thereby we
gathered key performance indicators and the level of
agreement with statements was determined using a
5 point likert scale, ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 5,
strongly agree. The questionnaire was distributed via re-
liable channels such as the association for German mu-
nicipalities (Deutscher Städte und Gemeindebund –
DStGB) to obtain a stratiﬁed sample. In total there are
11,197 municipal entities in Germany that are distributed
across 16 federal states. In total we gathered 2971 re-
sponses. Among these were 1298 completed surveys,
which represents a response rate of 11.6% and a comple-
tion rate of 43.7%. This sample is representative in terms
of sizes and states (see Table 1).
3.4. Model
Drawing from the hypotheses derived in Section 2 we
developed a model for the analysis. The components of the
model (Fig. 1) are described in the following sections.
3.4.1. Dependent variable
To analyse the determinants which encourage munici-
palities to sign-up to an EPC we use the active consideration
of this governance mode for modernising their street
lighting (see Fig. 1). This gives a better understanding of
drivers and barriers to engagement as actual use of EPC israther limited (see Section 3.1). EPC is considered a niche
application in most countries (Bertoldi et al., 2014; Marino
et al., 2011; Transparense, 2013; Combines, 2014).3.4.2. Independent variables
The independent variables consist of scales with multi-
ple
items that relate to the hypotheses outlined in the theo-
retical framework. They include barriers to retroﬁtting
(such as missing personnel capacity, inadequate ﬁnancial
resources for infrastructure etc.), drivers for contracting
(minimising personnel, investments and risks), barriers for
EPC (personnel capacity, missing ﬂexibility, bad experi-
ences in the past, unfair balance of interests, other legal
partnerships, veto from regulatory authorities) as well as
the usage of tools and consulting. Finally we include de-
mographic factors that inﬂuence the decision of a muni-
cipality to engage in EPC, such as ﬁnancial constraints
(measured as the presence of a formal state of budget
control) and inhabitants (size) that also serve as control
variables (see Fig. 1).3.5. Econometric procedures
To study the willingness of municipalities to engage in
EPC as a categorical/binary outcome the use of a logistic
regression is appropriate (Hair, 2010; Kutner et al., 2005;
Cohen et al., 2009; Wooldridge et al., 2009). It enables
the calculation of the propensity of a certain case be-
longing to one or the other category based on dis-
criminant Z scores. These scores are inﬂuenced by char-
acteristics of the independent variables. Logistic regres-
sion does not require the strict assumptions of multi-
variate normality (i.e. normally distributed variables) as
well as equal variance-covariance matrices. The error
term of the underlying distribution does not follow the
normal but the binominal distribution, invalidating most
tests based on the normal distribution. It behaves similar
to multivariate regression for metric dependent variables
and can incorporate metric and non-metric variables as
well as non-linear effects (Hair, 2010; Cohen et al., 2009).
Logistic regression requires a number of assumptions.
With regard to sample size, prior literature recommend
sample sizes greater than 400, which is the case in our
analysis (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Similarly, the in-
dependent variables exhibit the characteristics of hetero-
skedasticity (i.e. they have a common variance), which the
logistic regression is capable of dealing with.
++/-
+
-
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Control 
variables
Barriers to retrofitting
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Fig. 1. Model of the quantitative regression analysis.
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4.1. Descriptive results
The descriptive statistics (see Table A.1) give an over-
view of the nature of our data (for a detailed descriptive
analysis see also von Flotow and Polzin, 2015).4 The drivers
and barriers variables have been evaluated on a 5 point
likert scale, which corresponds to the values in the table.
Financial support variables represent the share of street
lighting that has been modernised using the speciﬁc sup-
port. All other variables have been assessed as categorical
or binary variables.
In the full sample, 20% of the municipalities experi-
ence ﬁnancial constraints. Among the barriers to retro-
ﬁtting the lack of funds for adjacent infrastructure and
personnel capacity are the most salient. 224 of the mu-
nicipalities consider engaging in an EPC while 68 local
authorities actively employ EPCs for street lighting. Po-
tential drivers for EPC are equally important for muni-
cipalities whereas among the barriers to EPC, the lack of
ﬂexibility and missing ﬂexibility rank ﬁrst. Municipalities
commonly engage directly with energy consultants and
energy agencies while direct engagement with lawyers
and ESCos is less common. In the retroﬁtting process
comparative calculations and guidelines are most pre-
valent as tools.4 More granular supporting data cannot be made openly available due to
ethical concerns (privacy of the respondents). Further information about the data
and conditions for access are available at the Sustainable Business Institute (SBI)
Contact: www.sbi21.de.)Comparing the sub-samples of municipalities that
consider or already use EPC with the full sample reveals
some interesting differences, although the general pat-
terns are similar. On the one hand, barriers to retroﬁtting
are perceived as more severe among municipalities that
consider/use EPC. On the other hand, drivers for EPC are
evaluated as more important whereas the barriers to EPC
are perceived as less severe. Municipalities with a ten-
dency towards EPC or usage tend to engage more with
lawyers and ESCos compared to consultants which might
be expected. Also the adoption of standard contracts as
tools is higher among these local authorities. Interest-
ingly, among the EPC users, tools for modernisation are
less common. Additionally we gathered data about the
ownership and management situation of street lighting
in municipalities. 78% of local authorities that responded
to the survey own their street lighting. This makes them
free to choose between in-house management (30%)
with some outsourcing services (21%), a national EUCo
(28%), a local MUCo (15%) and a third-party contractor
(ESCo) (3%) using EPC.
These results conﬁrm prior research that highlighted
EPC as a niche application for general public infra-
structure retroﬁts (Marino et al., 2011; Pätäri and
Sinkkonen, 2014; Hannon et al., 2013; Sorrell, 2005).
Interestingly, when it comes to retroﬁtting speciﬁc in-
frastructures (i.e. street lighting), local authorities ex-
hibit a greater tendency to rely more on outsourcing.
Hence within the process of retroﬁtting, 5% of the mu-
nicipalities rely on an EPC to manage the street lighting.
This may be the result of lower transaction costs asso-
ciated with outsourcing speciﬁc infrastructures and
Table 2
Results of the logistic regression analysis.
Nr. Considering EPC Coef. (Std. Err.)
1 Inhabitants 0.27* (0.15)
2 Financial constraints 0.68*** (0.22)
3 Register streetlight present 0.24* (0.14)
4 Barriers to retroﬁtting: Personnel capacity 0.23*** (0.09)
5 Barriers to retroﬁtting: Missing best practices 0.12 (0.10)
6 Barriers to retroﬁtting: Waiting for future
savings
0.14 (0.11)
7 Barriers to retroﬁtting: Existing
partnerships
0.30*** (0.10)
8 Barriers to retroﬁtting: Risks outweigh the
savings
0.20* (0.12)
9 Barriers to retroﬁtting: No funds for
infrastructure
0.17** (0.09)
10 Drivers for EPC: Minimising investment 0.97*** (0.20)
11 Drivers for EPC: Minimising ﬁnancial risk 0.85*** (0.20)
12 Drivers for EPC: Minimising personnel 0.35*** (0.20)
13 Barriers to EPC: Personnel capacity 0.23*** (0.10)
14 Barriers to EPC: Lack of ﬂexibility 0.08 (0.12)
15 Barriers to EPC: Bad experience outsourcing 0.14 (0.12)
16 Barriers to EPC: No balance of interests 0.14 (0.14)
17 Barriers to EPC: Existing legal partnerships 0.37*** (0.09)
18 Barriers to EPC: Veto from budgetary control
authorities
0.05 (0.12)
19 Consulting: Energy consultant 0.42** (0.22)
20 Consulting: Lawyer 0.69** (0.33)
21 Consulting: ESCo 2.44*** (0.41)
22 Consulting: Energy agency 0.25 (0.28)
23 Knowledge street lighting 0.03 (0.18)
24 Tools: Guidelines 0.17 (0.23)
25 Tools: Checklist 0.00 (0.27)
26 Tools: Evaluation matrix 0.00 (0.28)
27 Tools: Comparative calculations 0.05 (0.22)
28 Tools: Standard contracts 2.39*** (0.66)
29 Financial support: Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau
0.013 (0.56)
30 Financial support: National Climate
Initiative
1.05*** (0.40)
31 Financial support: State level 1.80 (1.13)
32 Financial support: Local level 0.72 (1.57)
33 Financial support: Other 0.96 (0.75)
_cons 2.84*** (0.76)
N (observations) 1016
Initial –2LL 707.97
Model Chi2 (d.f.) 274.09 (33)***
McFadden's pseudo R2 0.28
Notes: ***,**,*, denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respec-
tively; Logit command was used (Stata 13.1)
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tricate and interdependent technologies. Mapping pos-
sible individual or unique combinations of technologies
(e.g. insulations, boiler and lighting) in a comprehensive
energy service contract (comprising several technolo-
gies) would increase the cost of monitoring. Also, light
bulbs, compared to other energy efﬁciency technologies
(such as insulation), can be easily removed and col-
lected once the client cannot pay the contracting fee.
This reduces the risk of opportunism on the side of the
client.
Table A.2 provides the aggregated correlation matrix for
the dependent and independent variables. A full correla-
tion table is included in the supplementary material of this
article (Appendix B). There is a higher degree of correlation
between the independent variables that represent a com-
mon theme (i.e. barriers to EPC). However, there is lower
correlation between items across constructs (e.g. ‘barriers
to retroﬁtting’). Hence multicollinearity between the ex-
planatory variables is not an issue.
4.2. Drivers and barriers for EPC in a municipal setting (logistic
regression results)
Table 2 shows the results of our logistic regression, de-
termining the categories of Considering energy service
contracts for modernisation activities (1 or 0). The magni-
tude of the coefﬁcients as well as the signiﬁcance levels are
shown. In addition the overall effectiveness of the model is
assessed using Chi2 and (McFadden) pseudo R2 results. The
sample size of 1016, which was obtained through the re-
moval of cases with missing answers from the initial
sample, provides a robust basis for the assessments of in-
dividual variables. Our ﬁtted model can signiﬁcantly pre-
dict the outcome (i.e. whether or not a municipality con-
siders EPC) – see Chi2 statistic signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
The ﬁtted model further explains over a quarter of the
variance, i.e. reasons why a municipality considers an EPC
solution for retroﬁtting – see McFadden's pseudo R2 of 0.28
(Long and Freese, 2006).
Below, we discuss our results in light of the hypotheses
derived above and thereby contribute to the literature on
EPC in the public sector.
4.2.1. Barriers to retroﬁtting as potential drivers for an ESCo solution
Our results show that ﬁnancial constraints represent a
signiﬁcant driver for municipalities to engage with a
private ESCo (Table 2, line 2). This conﬁrms hypothesis
H1a. Hence EPC could be a means to alleviate budgetary
constraints by reducing the ﬁnancial burden in terms of
energy costs. We further hypothesised personnel con-
straints to carry out the retroﬁtting as being a major
driver for a local authority to consider engagement with
an ESCo for modernisation. Retroﬁtting activities require
capacities to evaluate technologies and products and to
design an implementation strategy (H1b). Our results also
warrant the acceptance of this hypothesis (Table 2, line 4).
Our results therefore quantitatively conﬁrm earlier work
in the context of municipal modernisation (Polzin et al.,
2015; Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014; Marino et al., 2011;
Aasen et al., 2016).
In addition, the estimations show that EPC is considered
a means to holistically modernise infrastructure (Table 2,
line 9). In this respect we go beyond extant work (Pätäriand Sinkkonen, 2014; Marino et al., 2011; Aasen et al.,
2016). Missing funds to improve complementary infra-
structure for lighting signiﬁcantly drives the willingness to
consider an EPC. This aligns well with our results showing
that minimising investments, related risks and personnel
would be/are the main reasons for considering an out-
sourcing solution.
Existing partnerships also have a signiﬁcant effect on
the willingness to consider energy service contracts as a
possible means of outsourcing (Table 2, line 7) (H1c). On
the one hand, experience with outsourcing leads to a po-
sitive attitude towards an EPC as trust had been established
(Backlund and Eidenskog, 2013; Marino et al., 2011; Aasen
et al., 2016). On the other hand, legal commitments (in the
form of maintenance contracts or commitments to MUCos
etc.) prevent municipalities from considering alternatives
such as EPC (see Table 2, line 17, relating to hypothesis
H3c).
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particularly with ESCos, relates to the perception of risks
(Table 2, line 8). According to our results, perceived high
risks of retroﬁtting do not lead to a higher willingness to
engage with an ESCo to mitigate these risks and thereby
reject hypothesis H1d (Jackson, 2010; Hannon and Bolton,
2015; Uyarra et al., 2014). On the contrary, we show that
the lower the perceived risk of a modernisation project, the
higher the willingness to consider an energy service solu-
tion, which is in line with previous research (Hannon and
Bolton, 2015). Still, this result necessitates further inter-
pretation, as it contradicts results related to hypothesis
H2b (see Table 2, line 11). One could argue that these
conﬂicting results point to the fact that municipalities do
not fully understand the risks related to the retroﬁtting
process, which an EPC solution could partially address.
Nevertheless, municipalities generally perceive out-
sourcing as a means to reduce risks (Pätäri and Sinkkonen,
2014).
Some barriers to modernisation such as personnel and
ﬁnancial constraints as well as missing funds for retro-
ﬁtting the adjacent infrastructure for lighting could ap-
parently be mitigated by an EPC. Others, such as waiting
for technological improvements in end-use energy de-
mand reduction technologies could not (see Table 2, lines
5–6) (Polzin et al., 2015; Steinberger et al., 2009).
We also evaluated the three most important reasons
for engaging in an energy service contract in the litera-
ture: Minimising ﬁnancial exposure, personnel and risks
(Polzin et al., 2015; Hannon and Bolton, 2015). According
to our estimations these all comprise highly relevant
factors (see Table 2, lines 10–12), with the ﬁnancial ar-
gument being most important, followed by reducing risks.
Reducing the personnel burden was considered a less
important driver for the outsourcing solution. Our results
differ from prior research on municipal motivations to
sign up to an EPC which highlighted reductions in per-
sonnel as a more important driver (Polzin et al., 2015;
Hannon and Bolton, 2015) (H2a–c).
4.2.2. Barriers to EPC in the public sector
As mentioned above, only 3% of German municipalities
use EPC. In other European countries EPC also represents a
niche application (Combines, 2014; Transparense, 2013),
which points towards the existence of strong inter-
dependencies between actors and a conservative institu-
tional environment. This ‘lock-in’ may be a reason for the
slow diffusion of LED lighting, end-use energy demand
reduction technologies in general and/or ESCo solutions.
Municipalities lacking sufﬁcient in-house expertise do not
appear to fully grasp the risks associated with the appli-
cation of new technologies as they would otherwise be
more inclined to outsource these risks to third parties.
Our study provides important insights into the assess-
ment of energy service contracts from the client side.
Although an EPC may reduce the need for in-house ca-
pacity to retroﬁt lighting infrastructure, skilled personnel
is nevertheless needed to manage the contract with the
private ESCo. Thus our results highlight missing personnel
for the management of an EPC as a signiﬁcant barrier
(H3a). According to our estimations, neither the missing
ﬂexibility in an EPC, perceived unfair balance of interests
(H3b), nor bad experience with sale-and-leaseback or
other public-private-partnerships (PPP) in the past (H3c),are signiﬁcant barriers for municipal representatives to
consider contracting as an alternative way of sourcing
(Table 2, lines 13–18). We contribute to the discussion of
ﬂexible vs. standardised contracts to enhance EPC diffu-
sion by highlighting that ﬂexibility of including main-
tenance measures in an EPC is a success factor (Aasen
et al., 2016). Too much ﬂexibility however increases
transaction costs and would render municipal application
unlikely (Polzin et al., 2015; Sorrell, 2007).
4.2.3. Competencies, capacities and tools to conduct an EPC
We theorised about the required capacities and com-
petencies to consider energy service contracts. Prior re-
search highlighted the deﬁnition of a baseline and cor-
responding procedures for measurement and veriﬁcation
as drivers for an EPC solution (H4a) (Hartmann et al.,
2014; Marino et al., 2011; Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014).
Our estimations differentiate these works into two sepa-
rate components, namely a measurement system for en-
ergy consumption and tools which support the overall
EPC process. In-house street lighting expertise and most
tools that are considered beneﬁcial for the retroﬁtting
process and an energy service solution do not exhibit a
signiﬁcant positive impact on the likelihood to consider
EPC as a means for implementing the modernisation (see
Table 2, lines 23–27). It appears likely that sufﬁcient in-
house expertise encourages in-house solutions. Still, the
use of standard contracts that carry a built in balance of
interest between municipality and guaranteed savings
exhibits a strong signiﬁcant probability to consider EPC.
Finally, detailed energy cost information (in this case a
complete inventory of the lighting infrastructure) for
measurement and veriﬁcation makes the consideration of
an energy service solution more likely as ESCos can build
upon these numbers and calculate the business case more
easily (Table 2, line 3) (H4b). We thereby quantitatively
conﬁrm earlier work (Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014; Aasen
et al., 2016).
Furthermore, we had concurring hypotheses regard-
ing the use of speciﬁc tools for an EPC solution and
modernisation in general. In this regard our results
highlight concrete means of reducing the legal com-
plexity of EPC as signiﬁcant (Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014;
Marino et al., 2011). Standard contracts that could
achieve this aim have a highly signiﬁcant positive inﬂu-
ence on the consideration of contracting as a possible
means of outsourcing (Table 2, line 28). Hence we can
partly accept hypothesis H5a. This result further sup-
ports the argument of standardised contracts as a means
to reduce transaction costs of EPC (Sorrell, 2007; Polzin
et al., 2015). Other tools (Table 2, lines 24–27) neither
precluded the consideration of contracting (as in-house
modernisation would be more attractive when the ne-
cessary tools are at hand) nor further raised awareness
for this form of outsourcing (H5b).
4.2.4. The role of consultants in EPC
Prior research suggested the positive role of facilitators
to cope with the complexity of the retroﬁtting process such
as planning, tendering, implementation and monitoring
(H6) (Bleyl et al., 2013; Polzin et al., 2015; Lemon et al.,
2015; Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). Our estimations provide
useful insights into this debate. Consulting an ESCo or a
lawyer in the modernisation process leads towards a
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energy consultants tend to negatively inﬂuence this prob-
ability and consulting an energy agency has no statistically
signiﬁcant effect (Table 2, lines 19–22). This could be due to
the fact that municipalities engaging with an energy con-
sultant source the necessary resources to conduct the ret-
roﬁtting on their own. Energy consultants might also
consider themselves as technology and implementation
companions, not as holistic process or procurement ad-
visors, which is likely to neglect outsourcing options or
legal competencies. Thus we can mostly reject our hy-
pothesis H6. However, prior qualitative evidence point to-
wards a knowledge deﬁcit of energy consultants with re-
gard to outsourcing and energy service solution and a po-
sitive role of energy agencies (Polzin et al., 2015).
In addition to the theorised results our estimations pro-
vide supplementary insights. Regarding the relationship be-
tween the size of the municipality and the use of EPC our
results contradict prior research ﬁndings (see Table 2, line 1).
Whereas Aasen et al. (2016) proposed no relationship be-
tween the size of the municipality and the likelihood to en-
gage in EPC, we highlight a slightly positive signiﬁcant in-
ﬂuence. Hence the larger the municipality, the higher the
willingness to consider an EPC solution.
Finally, our study emphasises the need to design
support schemes that do not exclude an EPC solution
(Table 2, line 30). In Germany the support measures did
not include the possibility of engaging with a third-party,
which leads to a signiﬁcant negative probability of mu-
nicipalities even considering an EPC solution if subsidies
need to be rejected in return. With these results we
complement recent work that highlighted a conducive
policy framework as a major determinant for ESCo mar-
ket development (Hannon et al., 2015; Marino et al.,
2011; Bertoldi et al., 2014).
4.3. Robustness checks
We conducted a number of robustness checks to check
the consistency of our results. Firstly, we checked for
multi-collinearity i.e. the correlation among explanatory/
independent variables. Investigating the variance inﬂa-
tion factors (VIFs) reveals no multicollinearity, given the
mean VIF of 1.25 and all individual values are below
2 which is well below the critical value of 5 (see Kutner
et al. (2005)). Second, we ran our model using probit re-
gression technique. The estimator displayed
consistent results. Third, we aggregated the variables
(barriers for retroﬁtting, drivers and barriers for EPC,
consulting, tools and ﬁnancial support) and ran a logistic
regression again. The analysis displayed overall consistent
results regarding the direction of and the height of the
coefﬁcients. Overall barriers to retroﬁtting positively in-
crease the likelihood of considering EPC while drivers and
barriers to EPC exhibit a positive respectively negative
inﬂuence on the consideration of EPC. When
aggregated, the usage of tools loses its explanatory power,
consulting becomes overall positive and ﬁnancial support
schemes have an overall negative inﬂuence (see Table A.3
in the Appendix A).
5. Conclusions and policy implications
Accelerating the uptake of EPCs for retroﬁtting among
public actors such as municipalities is economically andsocially desirable as it bears a huge (mostly untapped)
potential for reducing carbon emissions and energy de-
pendency as well as providing a relief for public budgets.
However, this does not necessarily mean that EPC is al-
ways the most cost effective solution as this depends on
competencies, capacities and existing partnerships. Total
costs of EPC could be higher than of an in-house solution
especially if the municipality has the technical, procure-
ment and risk analysis capabilities in house (which is
partly the case for larger cities). Hence, for an effective
and efﬁcient retroﬁtting, it is necessary to increase market
transparency but also municipal capacity and competency
to allow for a rational choice among in-house and out-
sourcing options.
The aim of this study was to quantify determinants
for the consideration of energy service contracts as a
means to modernising public properties (in this case
public street lighting). Complementing prior research
that has either dealt with barriers to ESCo market de-
ployment on the supra-national level (Bertoldi et al.,
2006; Marino et al., 2011; Bertoldi et al., 2014; Vine,
2005) or explored drivers and barriers in case studies
covering the UK, Finland, Norway and Germany (Pätäri
and Sinkkonen, 2014; Hannon and Bolton, 2015; Han-
non et al., 2013; Polzin et al., 2015; Aasen et al., 2016;
Nolden and Sorrell, 2016), this analysis evaluates dri-
vers and barriers of an EPC solution in a large survey
among German municipalities.
We can conclude that several barriers to retroﬁtting
such as existing partnerships, missing ﬁnancial resources
for the modernisation of complementary infrastructure,
missing personnel capacity as well as overall ﬁnancial
constraints lead to a higher propensity of considering an
EPC solution. This corresponds well with the overall aim of
the municipalities to reduce both the ﬁnancial burden of
investments and associated risks. Speciﬁc barriers to EPC
lie in missing management capacity (both in terms of
quantity and quality) and existing legal arrangements such
as other modes of governance (especially long-term con-
tracts with EUCos).
Most tools and expertise for the retroﬁtting process
do not represent drivers for an EPC solution. However,
engaging ESCos and lawyers as consultants in the ret-
roﬁtting process increases the likelihood of considering
energy service contracts. Energy consultants, on the
other hand, may reduce the likelihood of municipalities
to consider an EPC solution, possibly as a result of
limited expertise and experience in this domain. Fi-
nally, support schemes for public sector retroﬁts
should not preclude the use of energy service contract
models (as they did in the German case) in order to
fully make use of beneﬁcial aspects of private sector
engagement and to alleviate ﬁnancial constraints in the
long run.
5.1. Implications for policy makers and ESCos
The estimations based on this survey have implications
for decision makers in the public sector on the local, na-
tional or supranational level. Policy makers are the actors
setting the regulations for market transparency, encoura-
ging efﬁcient retroﬁtting to address climate and budgetary
concerns on the one hand and implementing retroﬁts on
the other.
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need to enhance expertise of facilitators and to effectively
develop a more diverse energy service market for retro-
ﬁtting. It is important to distinguish between different
types of facilitators. Whereas technical facilitators that
support the retroﬁtting process are well established, pro-
cess facilitators that accompany the procurement (includ-
ing the decision regarding outsourcing) could be better
supported. Evidence from the UK suggests that process
facilitators, particularly regarding the procurement pro-
cess, can contribute to the reduction of transaction costs
associated with EPCs (Nolden et al., 2015; Nolden and
Sorrell, 2016).
Public authorities in the EU are subject to public
procurement law, for which long-term EPC as a combi-
nation of goods and services might be challenging. In-
troducing statutory obligations for tendering to include
more market-based solutions may improve choice and
competition among governance models (Polzin et al.,
2015). In addition, legislation at the EU level could be
streamlined regarding the criteria for categorizing EPCs
as a good or a service. These criteria should be then
diffused among the municipalities. Additionally, ac-
counting rules treating EPC as debt should be changed to
address municipal budgetary issues. EPC provides the
opportunity to modernise infrastructure while lowering
the ﬁnancial burden in the long run.
Reducing the (legal) complexity of an EPC solution
through by promoting standard contracts is highly re-
commended to accelerate appropriate uptake of EPCs in
the public sector. Although the ﬂexibility of including
maintenance services might have beneﬁcial effects, the
overall contract should be standardised, with balance of
interests between the local authority and the ESCo ac-
counted for. Standardisation reduces transaction costs
relating to designing and negotiating the contract, which
initiatives by the Department for Energy and Climate
Change in the UK and SBI in Germany also show (SBI,
2013; Mayor of London, 2014). A solution to this trade-off
may lie in modular contracts that offer different options
such as maintenance, measurement and veriﬁcation,
supply of energy, contract duration or transfer of own-
ership to a special purpose vehicle (during or after the
EPC).
Above all, capacity and competencies at the local
level, both to implement modernisation processes and,
where applicable, to consider possible ways of out-
sourcing, are considering crucial. Hence, policy makers
should support the municipalities in gathering im-
portant information required for a neutral tender in
which an EPC may be considered. We recommend the
enhanced diffusion of best practices and guidelines,
especially regarding the criteria to design tenders (see
also Polzin et al. (2015)). Finally, support schemes that
target the modernisation of public properties should
not exclude an EPC solution to fully engage the private
sector. On the other hand, public incentives for ESCo
solutions could be combined with a white certiﬁcate
system that speciﬁes savings at the client level to be
achieved by utilities and network carriers.
The research reported here also has implications for
ESCos targeting the public property and infrastructure
market. First and foremost, the ESCo has to be aware of
the fact that municipalities considering an EPC solutionaim at reducing the ﬁnancial and personnel burden for
retroﬁtting as well as related risk in the long run while at
the same time having limited personnel to manage the
ESCo solution. To be economically viable, the total costs
of an EPC (including production, transaction and ﬁnance
costs – see Sorrell (2005) and Polzin et al. (2015)) need to
be below the current and projected energy bill and the
calculation should be readily accessible to municipal
representatives. Second, to reduce (perceived) legal
complexity our results strongly encourage the use of
standard contracts that have a built in guarantee for
savings and a fair balance of interest. However, these
factors did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the propensity of
considering energy service contracts for retroﬁtting in
the ﬁrst place.
5.2. Limitations and future research
The authors of this research article acknowledge lim-
itations that stem from the cross-sectional nature of the
data and the focus on only one market and possible ap-
plication for end-use energy demand reduction tech-
nologies. Hence future research might ﬁrstly expand this
research by analysing the possibility for servitization of a
combination of retroﬁt technologies, especially with re-
gard to legal complexity and associated challenges. Sec-
ondly, scholars could conduct longitudinal analyses to
see how determinants of an EPC solution in the public
sector change over time. Additionally a survey based
analyses could be conducted in other institutional set-
tings to allow comparisons with research reported here.
It is also unclear what a municipal loss of control over
technologies such as lighting imply in the long run,
particularly if ﬂexibility regarding lighting hours is to be
taken into account.Acknowledgements
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Questionnaire (translated from German)
Demographics
1. How many inhabitants does your municipality have? (o5.000,
5.000o50.000, 50.000o100.000,4100.000).
2. Is municipality controlled by a supervisory agency with bud-
getary powers (ﬁnancial constraints) (yes/no).
3. In which federal state is your municipality located? (16 German
states).
Lighting (current state)
F. Polzin et al. / Energy Policy 94 (2016) 317–330 3274. How does the ownership structure look like? (ownership
municipality, ownership EUCo/MUCo, possession municipality,
possession EUCo/MUCo, partly privatized, completely priva-
tized, other).
5. Who manages the street lighting? (own management, partly
outsourced, management by municipal utility, management by
utility company, energy service contracting, other).
6. Are the information about the state of the lighting system
stored in a register (energy consumption, age, type of lamp,
power, hours of operation)? (yes/no/partially).
7. How many lamps of the following types are you currently
using? (High pressure mercury vapor lamps (MVL), sodium-
vapor lamps (SVL), metal halide lamps (MHL), (compact)
ﬂuorescent lamps, LED lamps).
8. Besides street lighting, where are you also deploying LED in
your municipality? (sports facilities, indoor lighting, decorative
lighting for places of interest, other).
Retroﬁtting of lighting
9. Have you modernised (in the last ten years), do you modernise
or do you plan to modernise the street lighting installations?
(yes/no).
10. To what extent do you use LED technology for your moder-
nisation activities? (none (0%) rarely (0-20%), medium (20-
50%), by the majority (50-80%), predominantly (480%).
11. Why are you not using LED technology for your modernisa-
tion? (too complex, too expensive, not mature enough, already
converted to SVL, we prefer to wait, bad experiences with LED
retroﬁts, other).
12. To what extent do you use SVL technology for your moder-
nisation activities? (none (0%) rarely (0-20%), medium (20-
50%), by the majority (50-80%), predominantly (480%).
13. Why are you not using SVL/MHL technology for your moder-
nisation? (too complex, too expensive, not mature enough, we
prefer to wait, bad experiences with LED retroﬁts, other).
Drivers for retroﬁtting
14. What are the most important preconditions or success factors
for a successful modernisation of public street lighting? (very
high technical understanding (for the development of a mod-
ernisation plan and to conduct the corresponding tendering
and evaluation of different offers, predictability of proﬁtability
of the retroﬁtting measures, support of independent con-
sultants (for example, energy agencies, energy consultants,
lawyers etc., participation of the population).
15. Additional drivers/preconditions.
Barriers to retroﬁtting
16. What are the main barriers for modernisation activities? (the
personnel capacity for the modernisation plan and the ten-
dering process is not available, there is far too little positive
experiences with respect to the success of the modernisation
measures or use of LED in other municipalities, future tech-
nologies might offer even more savings offer; a modernisation
at the present time would come too early, there are concession
contracts or partnerships that preclude a modernisation, the
EU eco-design directive does not change the availability of
traditional light bulbs for the foreseeable future, the necessary
ﬁnancial resources for the modernisation of the adjacent in-
frastructure (masts, cables, etc.) are not available, there are too
high risks vs. potential savings).
17. Additional barriers.
Energy service contracts18. Are you considering energy performance contracting for street
lighting? (yes/no).
19. Are you actually using EPC? (yes/no).
20. Which form of energy service contract are you using? (energy
performance contract, energy service contract without guar-
anteed savings, energy supply contract with guaranteed sav-
ings, energy supply contract).
Drivers of energy service contracts
21. What are/would be the reasons to source your street lighting
out to a third-party contractor? (Minimising the investment
and the necessary borrowing, minimising the ﬁnancial risk
(long-term calculable costs for energy-saving effect and light
quality, transfer of default risk to the Contractor), minimising
the current stafﬁng and other resources of the local authority
for the operation and planning of the municipal street
lighting).
22. What are the success factors of an ESCo solution? (manu-
facturer-independent support / consulting (for example, by
consultants, lawyers or energy agencies), neutral tenders (re-
garding the products), early involvement of the local politi-
cians, administration and population, transparency of the
contract and a balance of interests, comprehensibility or sim-
plicity of the contracts, guaranteed savings).
23. Additional drivers.
Barriers to energy service contracts
24. What are the barriers for an EPC solution? (the required ca-
pacity for preparation, tendering and evaluation of the offers is
not available, the possibility of ﬂexible control during the
contract duration is not feasible, there are too many bad ex-
periences with public-private partnerships, cross-border leases
etc., a fair balancing of interests between private sector and
municipal interests is no possible, existing concession contracts
or old lighting contracts hinder us, an approval of the energy
service contract by the budgetary control authority (due to
forfeiting) is difﬁcult).
25. Additional barriers.
Consulting
26. Which consulting services are you using? (energy consultant,
energy agency, lawyer, contractor).
27. Which (independent) consultant can you recommend?
28. Why are you not using any consulting services? (too expensive,
unknown, not required, other) Competencies and tools.
29. How would you rate your knowledge/skills regarding street
lighting? (poor, good, very good).
30. Which of the following tools are you using? (technical check-
list, guidelines for modernisation, evaluation matrix for pro-
ducts, comparative calculations schemes, standard contracts).
Regulatory framework
31. Which part of your street lighting have you modernised using
the following ﬁnancial support measures? (Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau (federal level), National Climate Initiative (fed-
eral level), state level, local level, other).
32. What are the reasons not using any ﬁnancial support me-
chanisms? (too expensive, unknown, not required, other).
End
33. Would you be willing to participate in a case study dealing
with modernisation activities and energy service contracting?
34. Here you can leave your email address if you like to receive
the results of this survey and additional information or
materials.
Table A.1
Descriptive statistics.
Nr. Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Agreement (% of 1 or 4 and
5)
Measurement
1 Consideration EPC 1227 0.18 0.39 0 1 18.26 Dummy variable
2 Inhabitants 1298 1.87 0.71 1 4 n.a. o5.000 (1), 5.000o50.000 (2), 50.000o100.000
(3),4100.000) (4)
3 Financial constraints 1073 0.20 0.40 0 1 19.94 Dummy variable
4 Register streetlight present 1298 1.31 0.76 0 2 n.a. Yes (2), partially (1), No (0)
5 Barriers to retroﬁtting 1298 17.24 4.7 7 35 n.a. Aggregated variable
6 Personnel capacity 1298 2.30 1.32 1 5 39.06 Likert scale 1–5
7 Missing best practices 1298 2.39 1.18 1 5 20.26 Likert scale 1–5
8 Waiting for future savings 1298 2.32 1.05 1 5 14.18 Likert scale 1–5
9 Existing partnerships 1298 1.63 1.10 1 5 9.40 Likert scale 1–5
10 Risks outweigh the savings 1298 3.25 1.33 1 5 11.48 Likert scale 1–5
11 No funds for infrastructure 1298 2.24 1.04 1 5 51.93 Likert scale 1–5
12 Drivers for EPC 1227 1.21 0.88 0 3 n.a. Aggregated variable
13 Minimising investment 1227 0.39 0.49 0 1 38.63 Dummy variable
14 Minimising ﬁnancial risks 1227 0.36 0.48 0 1 35.94 Dummy variable
15 Minimising personnel 1227 0.46 0.50 0 1 46.05 Dummy variable
16 Barriers to EPC 1227 1.87 3.83 6 30 n.a. Aggregated variable
17 Personnel capacity 1227 3.21 1.21 1 5 41.73 Likert scale 1–5
18 Lack of ﬂexibility 1227 3.52 0.98 1 5 52.65 Likert scale 1–5
19 Bad experience outsourcing 1227 3.30 1.02 1 5 39.12 Likert scale 1–5
20 No balance of interests 1227 3.29 0.91 1 5 37.16 Likert scale 1–5
21 Existing legal partnerships 1227 2.51 1.31 1 5 23.06 Likert scale 1–5
22 Surveillance authorities 1227 2.83 0.92 1 5 15.4 Likert scale 1–5
23 Consulting 1298 0.64 0.80 0 4 n.a. Aggregated variable
24 Energy consultant 1298 0.39 0.49 0 1 38.91 Dummy variable
25 Lawyer 1298 0.06 0.24 0 1 6.39 Dummy variable
26 ESCo 1298 0.04 0.21 0 1 4.62 Dummy variable
27 Energy agency 1298 0.147 0.34 0 1 13.79 Dummy variable
28 Knowledge about street
lighting
1298 1.94 0.64 1 3 n.a. Poor (1), moderate (2), very good (3)
29 Tools 1227 1.0 1.1 0 5 n.a. Aggregated variable
30 Guidelines 1227 0.27 0.44 0 1 27.14 Dummy variable
31 Checklist 1227 0.21 0.41 0 1 21.43 Dummy variable
32 Evaluation matrix 1227 0.19 0.39 0 1 18.83 Dummy variable
33 Comparative calculations 1227 0.35 0.48 0 1 34.88 Dummy variable
34 Standard contracts 1227 0.03 0.16 0 1 2.53 Dummy variable
35 Financial support 1298 0.33 0.38 0 3 n.a. Aggregated variable
36 Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau
1298 0.06 0.18 0 1 n.a. % of retroﬁtted street lighting ﬁnanced
37 National Climate Initiative 1298 0.20 0.29 0 1 n.a. % of retroﬁtted street lighting ﬁnanced
38 State level 1298 0.03 0.12 0 1 n.a. % of retroﬁtted street lighting ﬁnanced
39 Local level 1298 0.01 0.09 0 1 n.a. % of retroﬁtted street lighting ﬁnanced
40 Other 1298 0.03 0.13 0 1 n.a. % of retroﬁtted street lighting ﬁnanced
Table A.2
Correlation matrix (aggregated measures).
1 2 3 4 5 12 16 23 28 29 35
1 1.00
2 0.12*** 1.00
3 0.17*** 0.18*** 1.00
4 0.05 0.25*** 0.10*** 1.00
5 0.10*** 0.00 0.01 0.10*** 1.00
12 0.24*** 0.01 0.05 0.07** 0.14*** 1.00
16 0.15*** 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.31*** 0.02 1.00
23 0.16*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.07** 1.00
28 0.03 0.26*** 0.00 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.03 1.00
29 0.02 0.18*** 0.07** 0.17** 0.11*** 0.02 0.01 0.09*** 0.23*** 1.00
35 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.05 0.04 0.19*** 0.02 0.04 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.04 1.00
Notes: Category numbers stem from Table A.1; ***,**, denote signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
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Table A.3
Logistic regression results (aggregated measures).
Consideration contracting Coef. (Std. Err.)
Inhabitants 0.34nnn (0.14)
Financial constraints 0.73nnn (0.20)
Register streetlight 0.16 (0.13)
Knowledge street lighting 0.02 (0.16)
Barriers retroﬁtting 0.10nnn (0.02)
Drivers EPC 0.73nnn (0.10)
Barriers EPC 0.16nnn (0.03)
Tools 0.03 (0.09)
Financial support schemes 0.87nnn (0.27)
Consulting 0.31nnn (0.11)
_cons 2.4nnn (0.68)
N (observations 1016
Initial –2LL 810.31
Model Chi2 (d.f.) 171.76 (10)nnn
McFadden's pseudo R2 0.17
nnn Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level; Logit command was used (Stata 13.1).
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Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2016.03.049.References
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